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 Tackling the problem of gun violence in the United States is a major challenge facing 
society. Many different policies have been created in order to address annual gun violence rates 
including bans on firearm importation, purchase, sale, and possession. Assault weapons, 
handgun, and Saturday night special bans are the most common firearm bans aimed at 
combatting gun violence. This systematic review of the literature examined these three different 
firearms bans and provided an overview of the effectiveness of these interventions. Firearm bans 
must be weighed against the constitutionality of such acts. Each one of these firearm bans are 
impacted by the Second Amendment and this influences how firearm bans can be implemented 
and used. The findings suggest that, in general, not all firearm bans decrease gun violence rates, 
but they may have other impacts that can be considered effective. In this review, the mixed and 
conflicting results demonstrate the effects of these bans reach beyond only reducing gun violence 
rates and that reduction in gun violence rates may not be the final outcome of some of these 
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In the United States many deaths occur annually as a result of firearms. Lethal gun 
violence rates are driven by both homicide and suicide deaths. The United States has more gun 
violence annually compared to similarly developed countries. The firearm homicide rate in the 
United States is 19.5 times higher than other developed nations (Webster, Crifasi, & Vernick, 
2014). According to Laine, Taichman, Mulrow, Berkwitz, Cotton, and Williams (2013), “the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that in 2009, firearms were used in 
11,493 homicides (3.7 per 100,000 persons) and 18,735 suicides (6.1 per 100,000 persons). This 
means that the U.S. rate of firearm-related homicide, suicide, and unintentional death are higher 
than in other high-income countries” (p. 493). Sloan and colleagues (1988) compared homicide 
rates in Seattle, Washington and Vancouver, Canada, two cities in relatively close proximity with 
similarly situated demographics. Their findings support the notion that rates of firearm-related 
homicides are higher in the United States compared to other similarly developed countries, in 
this case, Canada. In their study, they found that “the relative risk of death from homicide, 
adjusted for age and sex, was significantly higher in Seattle than in Vancouver. Their findings 
suggest that there was a 4.8-fold higher risk of being murdered with a handgun in Seattle as 
compared to Vancouver” (Sloan et al., 1988, p. 1256). Additional research has suggested that 
two thirds of all homicides that occur in the United States involve a firearm.  
Many politicians, criminal justice officials, and citizens are concerned about the sheer 
magnitude of firearm violence in the country. A 2011 Gallup poll found policies which targeted 
gun violence rates are supported by many America citizens. Nearly half (47%) of surveyed 




time progressed, support for such policies has increased. A recent Pew Center Research survey 
found that 60% of Americans support stricter gun laws (Schaeffer, 2017). Therefore, two 
different surveys conveyed that the American public supports stricter gun controls. Public 
support for tougher policies has motivated policymakers to act on such support for stricter gun 
laws. 
In an effort to decrease gun violence rates in the U.S., policymakers have developed and 
used various interventions/policies. Firearms bans, a type of intervention, generally take one of 
three forms: assault weapons bans, handgun bans, or Saturday night special bans (Cherney, 
Morral & Schell, 2018). This paper will examine the research on firearm bans and discuss their 
effectiveness across a variety of domains commonly used by firearms researchers: gun 
availability/illicit gun markets, production trends, gun violence rates, and mass shootings.  
Policy recommendations will then be provided based on the evidence gathered from the 
literature review. Simply put, the literature review will guide recommendations about the 
effectiveness of firearms bans as a method to decrease gun availability/illicit gun markets, limit 
production, decrease gun violence rates, and decrease the number of mass shootings which occur 
in this country. For the purposes of this paper, the effectiveness of different firearm bans is 
assessed by determining whether the intervention had a significant impact on any one of these 
measures of effectiveness. This literature review will use the definition of firearms bans used by 
the Rand Corporation in its 2018 review of firearm laws; firearm bans make it illegal to own a 
specific class of firearm(s) prohibited by law—typically assault weapons, handguns, and 







BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Defining Firearm Bans   
Firearms bans have been implemented on the federal, state, and local level to restrict 
access to firearms or ban the possession of certain classes of firearms within jurisdictions 
(Murray, 1975). Firearm bans can target assault weapons, handguns, or low-quality cheap 
firearms (otherwise known as Saturday night specials). The logic that drives firearm bans is that 
if society restricts access to either specific firearms/ illicit gun markets or decrease production 
trends that this can decrease gun violence rates or mass shootings. Enacting firearm bans which 
limit access to certain types of guns and attaching additional penalties for not complying with 
firearm bans create a deterrence and incapacitation effect which have the potential to decrease 
gun violence rates. Therefore, if access to firearms is removed from individuals who are likely to 
use them for illicit purposes, firearm deaths could potentially be decreased.  
In the United States, gun violence takes the lives of approximately 32,000 individuals 
annually (Fowler et al., 2015). Medical conditions are the leading cause of death in the U.S.; 
however, when we look at objects that kill people, firearms are at the top of the list. Firearms kill 
or injury many people annually. Firearm bans can target both long guns and handguns. 
Typically, assault weapons are the most common type of long gun targeted by firearm bans. 
There is no universally agreed upon definition of what constitutes an assault weapon (Koper, 
Johnson, Nichols, Ayers, & Mullins, 2018). This is particularly due to the definitional issues; 
many statutes just list individual components of the gun which can be removed or modified to 
change the look of the firearm but fail to address the function of the rifle itself. According to one 




magazine and has at least 2 of- (i) a folding or telescoping stock; (II) a pistol grip that protrudes 
conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon; (iii) a bayonet mount; (iv) a flash suppressor or 
threaded barrel designed to accommodate a flash suppressor; and (v) a grenade launcher” 
(Phelan IV, 2013, p. 589). Though this is one example, the features listed are common parts that 
are often attached to legislation. If the look of a rifle changes due to eliminating the features that 
define it as an assault weapon within the law, the weapon will no longer be classified as such 
(Koper et al., 2018). In reality, the weapon will still function exactly the same and be equally 
dangerous as the pre-modified version of the same firearm. The ease of modification contributes 
to the difficulties in legally defining assault weapons (Koper et al., 2018).  
Firearm bans can also target handguns (Cook & Leitzel, 1996). Possession of a handgun 
can mean different things according to statute. Some handgun bans may refer to possession of a 
handgun outside of the home, while others may describe possession as having a handgun in any 
capacity.  
Handgun bans often target cheap, junk handguns, commonly referred to as Saturday night 
specials. These firearms are low-quality handguns which are inexpensive and prone to 
breaking/jamming. Essentially this type of handgun is not desired by individuals who collect or 
use guns regularity due to their low quality. They are more often used in crime compared to other 
more expensive firearms due to their low cost and disposability (Vernick, Webster, & Hepburn, 
1999). The goal behind Saturday night special bans is to target handguns that are commonly 
associated/recovered in many gun violence cases. Saturday night special bans leave individuals 
who are using cheap, low quality firearms in criminal offenses with more extreme choices to 
acquire firearms. They will have to buy more expensive firearms to commit their crime, choose 




History of Assault Weapons Bans  
 Federal Assault Weapons Bans  
  In order to provide objective policy recommendations on the topic of firearm bans, the 
history of different types of bans must be discussed along with specific instances of policy 
implementation. The first assault weapons ban implemented was the 1934 National Firearm Act 
(NFA). The federal government sought to limit access to certain types of firearms to address gun 
violence during the period. The NFA specifically targeted assault weapons because firearms such 
as Tommy guns, a type of fully automatic weapon, were commonly used by organized crime 
syndicates and other criminal enterprises. Before the enactment of the NFA, fully automatic 
assault weapons (machine guns) were considered legal (Roth & Koper, 1999). A growing 
concern about crime rates and violence led to the passage of the first assault weapons ban. 
According to Roth and Koper (1999), the 1934 NFA was very successful at removing most fully 
automatic assault weapons from general circulation in modern day civilian gun markets. This can 
be demonstrated by looking at modern day criminal acts and realizing that there are virtually no 
gun violence events where fully automatic machine guns are used (Roth & Koper, 1999).   
The 1934 NFA was the first step in a long lineage of assault weapons bans that would 
follow over subsequent decades. After the 1934 NFA, the next legislation to target assault rifles 
would come in 1968. The Gun Control Act of 1968 banned the importation of foreign made 
firearms except for those used for sporting purposes. Next, in 1989 the federal government made 
it illegal to import five categories of foreign rifles (Roth & Koper, 1999). The banning of 
foreign-made rifles was the result of a January 17, 1989 shooting in which an AKS rifle, a 
variant of the common military AK-47 rifle, was used to murder 5 children and injure 30 others 




outside of the United States and was subsequently prohibited by the 1989 federal ban on foreign 
import rifles. Today, the only assault weapons available for civilian purchase are ones 
manufactured in the United States. Following the 1989 assault weapons ban of foreign imports, 
the next federal assault weapons ban was passed in 1994 and remained until it expired in 2004. It 
made “the manufacture, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic firearms designed as 
assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines” illegal to own (Roth & Koper, 1999, 
p. 1). This federal assault weapons ban would only last ten years and then be reevaluated to 
consider its success. 
State and Local Assault Weapons Bans  
Though the federal government does not currently impose an assault weapons ban, some 
states have taken it upon themselves to create such policies. State assault weapons bans were 
created with the hope of preventing gun deaths and decreasing gun violence rates within 
individual state jurisdictions. They have enacted assault weapons bans that target specific 
features of rifles (firearm physical characteristics), many of which are shared across locations as 
states look to others for implementation guidance and work to build off the success of other 
locations (Schildkraut, 2019). The definitional meaning of an assault weapon also changed. In 
1989, California became the first state to classify an assault weapon as a semiautomatic rifle that 
had certain firearm characteristics as defined within the law (Halbrook, 2016). This ban was 
named the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 and classified assault weapons as 
“semi-automatic rifles with detachable magazines with two specified generic characteristics, 
such as a bayonet mount and a pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the 
weapon” (Halbrook, 2016, p. 50). This is where assault weapons began to be classified as semi-




impact subsequent assault weapons bans elsewhere. As of 2019, seven states (California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York) and the District of 
Columbia have implemented their own assault weapons bans (Koper, Johnson, & Nichols, 2018; 
Koper, Johnson, Nichols, Ayers, & Mullins, 2017; Schildkraut, 2019).  
Some localities have also enacted assault weapons bans. For example, assault weapons 
are illegal to own in Chicago, yet they can be purchased in other jurisdictions within the 
boundaries of the State of Illinois. Assault weapons bans have been adapted and changed over 
time with varying levels of success where they have been utilized. It is also important to note that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear appeals from state court cases where assault 
weapons bans have been put in place. This makes understanding the legality and regulation of 
assault weapons somewhat of a free for all; there is considerable variation across jurisdiction on 
the presence of assault weapons bans and the content of those bans. A concise and consistnet 
definition is lacking of what an assault weapon is and if these weapons should be permitted to be 
owned by civilians. Looking at what the literature has suggested in relation to the effectiveness 
of assault weapons bans can enable more informed policy decisions. Until the Supreme Court 
steps in and gives a concise ruling on what kind of assault weapons ban can be implemented, 
there will continue to be disagreement as to whether they are constitutional. 
History of Handgun Bans  
 Handgun bans are created to target the most common types of firearms used in violent 
crime. Handguns represent “40% of all civilian owned guns in circulation” (Weisser, 2018, p. 
21). They are, however, disproportionately used in crimes relative to other types of firearms.  




homicides” (p. 1256). As such, targeting handguns through firearm bans is a strategy that 
lawmakers have used in order to try to decrease gun violence rates.   
The first handgun ban was implemented in the District of Columbia in 1975 (Cook & 
Leitzel, 1996). It prohibited the ownership and possession of handgun(s) in public or in a 
citizen’s home. Basically, this was an all-out ban of handguns within this jurisdiction. The 
Firearms Control Regulations Act was created in order to decrease gun violence rates and lasted 
until the U.S. Supreme Court heard the District of Columbia v. Heller court case in 2008 
(Craven, 2010). According to case law, “in June 2008 the Supreme Court held the District of 
Columbia laws restricting the possession of firearms in one's home violated the Second 
Amendment right of individuals to keep and bear arms” (District of Columbia v. Heller, p. 1248, 
2011). The Court ruled “the D.C. handgun ban was unconstitutional because it removed the most 
common method of self-defense, rendering many people without viable alternatives” (Craven, 
2010, p. 854). The District of Columbia ban was ultimately considered an infringement on the 
fundamental principle of American law, that people have an individual right and a duty to protect 
themselves (Kates, 2007). The Heller decision stated that individuals had the right to possess a 
handgun inside the home for the purpose of self-protection. The requirement that lawfully owned 
handguns must be disassembled and bound by a trigger lock violated the Second Amendment. 
As shown later in this review, the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns was an effective 
policy that decreased gun violence rates in this jurisdiction. According to Kennedy, Piehl and 
Braga (1996), the District of Columbia’s ban was a good step in the right direction to “end the 
arms race in our neighborhoods and streets” (p. 1). After this court case set the precedent for all 
other court cases to follow, the handgun ban that was established in Chicago, Illinois was 




Chicago banned the possession of firearms in 1981, making it illegal to have firearms in 
the home or on one’s person in public (Cook & Leitzel, 1996). According to Ashman (1982), 
The District of Columbia’s ban set the standard on acceptable prohibitions against handguns. 
This essentially made the possession of handguns illegal within the jurisdiction of Chicago. It 
was illegal to own or possess a handgun in the city. This was ruled unconstitutional by the U.S 
Supreme Court and this ban was struck down. This leads into the next point of the legality and 
court cases which followed these two cities which utilized firearm bans.  
The ability of an individual to possess a handgun for self-defense, self-protection, and 
sporting purposes were the influencing factors that determined both the Heller and McDonald 
rulings. The Heller decision was a split vote 5-4 with two dissenting opinions. The Supreme 
Court established that an individual had an inherent right to self-preservation. The Supreme 
Court also established that firearms in common circulation could not be banned under federal, 
state, or local gun control laws. The Heller decision was a landmark court case that set a 
precedent for all other court cases to follow going forward in the handgun ban lineage. 
According to caselaw, “the Supreme Court explained the Second Amendment ‘codified a pre-
existing’ individual right to keep and bear arms, 554 U.S. at 592, 128 S.Ct. 2783, which was 
important to Americans not only to maintain the militia, but also for self-defense and hunting, id. 
at 599, 128 S.Ct. 2783” (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008, p. 1252). This ruling set the tone 
for McDonald v. Chicago to follow. Under this ban a citizen could not carry a handgun in public 
or possess one at their place of residence. In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in McDonald v. 
Chicago that the handgun ban was unconstitutional and stated it should be abolished (Craven, 
2010). Since the rulings in Heller and McDonald, handgun bans have had to be implemented or 




not unlimited, (id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783), and it gave some examples to illustrate the boundaries 
of that right” (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008, p. 1252). Consequently, it is more common 
to see handgun bans related to specific structures, buildings, or limited geographic areas. For 
example, it is permissible to restrict guns in school zones and on some college campuses. No 
longer do we see bans covering whole jurisdictions. The difference between this type of handgun 
regulation and an outright ban of handguns stems from the constitutionality of these restrictions. 
According to federal law, it is not illegal to restrict specific structures where handguns can be 
carried, but it is illegal to ban handguns from being possessed or carried by civilians everywhere 
(Craven, 2010).  
 It is easy to see how handgun bans have evolved over time. According to Rosenthal and 
Malcolm (2011), the Heller court case restricted federal government attempts to ban handguns; 
however, it was not until the McDonald case that individual citizens were protected from state 
municipal restrictions that attempted to take away their handguns. In the District of Columbia 
ruling, it was decided that an individual had a right to keep a firearm in their home and that the 
federal government could not take away a citizen’s constitutional rights to own a handgun. 
However, the District of Columbia ruling only applied to the federal government and not states 
or municipalities which may have prohibited handgun ownership. This is important because in 
order to understand how handgun bans are implemented, we must understand their history. 
Understanding why a ban was or was not effective could be directly tied to restrictions placed on 
it by its previous history. This is something that should be considered when reviewing the 
handgun ban literature. Knowing this could help to provide insightful solutions to the gun 
violence problems that exists in this country today. This could ultimately impact a great deal of 




History of Saturday Night Special Bans  
Saturday night special bans target cheap, low quality or junk handguns that are 
commonly associated/recovered in many gun violence cases (Vernick, Webster, & Hepburn, 
1999). According to Webster, Vernick, Bulzacchelli, and Vittes’s (2012), junk guns are “small-
caliber (.22, .25) and medium-caliber (.38, .380) handguns manufactured by companies that 
primarily or exclusively sell small, inexpensive (<$150) handguns” (p. 89). These types of guns 
are more often used in crimes compared to other types of firearms (Webster et al., 2012). In fact, 
they are “three and one-half times more likely to be used in the commission of crimes than other 
guns” (Shine, 1998, p. 1183). Saturday night special bans have been implemented in different 
U.S. jurisdiction to try to eliminate their market availability and prevent them from being used in 
criminal events. On the federal level, the Gun Control Act of 1968 targeted low-priced imported 
handguns used disproportionately in crime (Zimring, 1975).  
Though the Gun Control Act of 1968 addressed the big issue of cheap surplus handguns 
that were entering this country from foreign countries, it failed to address domestically made 
handguns that were similar in function and appearance (Zimring, 1975). Since the Gun Control 
Act of 1968 partially missed its mark and only banned cheap, low quality handguns from foreign 
countries, some states were forced to implement Saturday night special bans which focus on 
domestically produced guns. States where Saturday night special have been enacted include 
Maryland, California, New Jersey, and Hawaii (Hardy, 1983; Zimring, 1975). 
 On January 1, 1990, Maryland imposed a Saturday night special ban, an action that 
eventually resulted in other states following suit due to the law’s success. According to Vernick, 
Webster, and Hepburn (1999), Baltimore, Maryland’s implementation of a Saturday night special 




number of crime guns that were banned by Maryland law in comparison to 15 other cities outside 
of Maryland demonstrated that “a gun banned by Maryland’s law is more than twice as likely to 
be the subject of a crime gun trace request in 15 other cities combined than in Baltimore” 
(Vernick, Webster, and Hepburn, 1999, p. 259). Therefore, Maryland’s law was able to “reduce 
the use of banned Saturday night specials by criminals in Baltimore” (Vernick, Webster, and 
Hepburn, 1999, p. 259). Stated differently, Maryland’s law altered the types of firearms used in 
criminal events.   
 In 1993, California proposed the Violence Prevention Initiative (VPI) targeting handguns 
that were low quality and disposable low quality and disposable handguns commonly used in 
crimes within the state (Wallack, 1999). This initiative was also aimed at reducing youth gun 
violence rates partially resulting from cheap firearms. According to Calhoun (2013), the rate of 
homicide involving firearms increased 160% from 1960 to 1980, but other forms of homicide 
declined by 0.5% (Calhoun, 2013).  
This increase in deaths because of firearms resulted in the banning of Saturday night 
specials. The Violence Prevention Initiative put forth in California was a 5-year, $35 million- 
plan to implement Saturday night special bans and decrease gun violence rates. According to 
Wallack (1999) “prior to the VPI, there were no local SNS bans” (p. 841). This initiative was put 
in place very quickly because it was widely supported by the residents of California. According 
to Wallack (1999) “polls conducted early in the VPI indicated that 78% of voters in California 
supported a ban on SNSs. Even gun owners (76%) supported limits on these handguns, which 
were considered to be of poor quality, with little legitimate use for legal purposes” (p. 846). 
Citizens recognized the dangers associated with certain classes of handguns (i.e., cheap, 




Therefore, the public also recognized the need for the regulation of the types of firearms 
classified as Saturday night specials.  
 Saturday night special bans have also been a hot topic of interest in California due to 
many significant mass causality events associated with firearms in the state. California has had a 
long history of deadly gun violence where mass shootings have taken the lives of many people. 
Giving a brief summary of these events can help provide insight into how gun control measures 
have grown and adapted to the different needs of society. In 1978, there were political 
assassinations in San Francisco allowing gun control measures to gain traction (Godwin & 
Schroedel, 2000). One of these events was the Moscone-Milk assassinations, which took the life 
of San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Harvey Milk. They were both assassinated in the 
San Francisco City Hall by Dan White. Other events also reinforced the need to address firearm 
violence: the 1989 Stockton School Yard Massacre, the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, and the 1993 
California Street Massacre and Pasadena Halloween Youth Killings (Godwin & Schroedel, 
2000). These events combined created the impetus for change in California gun policies 
including the formation of Saturday night special bans.  
 New Jersey also enacted Saturday night special bans. Firearms which fall under this 
classification are treated like other consumer goods, as a dangerous product requiring regulation. 
This is important because it has allowed the politicians of New Jersey to impose a ban on 
specific types of handguns that are deemed more dangerous than other types of handguns (Kopel, 
2000). The goal of this strategy was to “protect consumers against the foreseeable criminal acts 
of third persons” (Jennings, 1997, p. 66). Protecting the consumers of New Jersey was also 
achieved by attaching a liability clause associated with the sale of Saturday night special 




criminal event, the possibility that the gun manufacturer or gun distributer could be held 
responsible was greatly increased. Certain types of guns deemed not practical for traditional 
consumers, or guns that were poorly built and favored by criminals due to their low price, were 
outlawed by New Jersey’s ban.  
 Hawaii also passed a Saturday night special ban in 1974 due to a societal concern over 
the dangerousness of the surplus junk firearms that were in circulation in Hawaii (Hardy, 1983). 
This policy decision was enacted to decrease the number of junk firearms in circulation within 
the borders of Hawaii because it was assumed if common means to commit violent offenses were 
limited, gun violence rates would decrease. There was no liability clause attached to Saturday 
night special firearms if they were used in a crime (Jennings, 1997). So, manufacurers or gun 
distributers could not be held accountable in the same way they could in New Jersey. This could 
have ultimately impacted the success of Saturday night special bans in Hawaii.  
 In summary, Saturday night special bans started in 1968 with a federal government law 
targeting low priced imported handguns which were being used disproportionately in crime 
(Zimring, 1975). The Gun Control Act of 1968 suffered from an important limitation—it only 
banned cheap, low quality handguns from foreign countries. This initiative drastically missed 
domestically produced, cheap, low quality handguns and only focused on one source of Saturday 
night special firearms.  Other states, including Maryland, California, New Jersey, and Hawaii, 
have implemented Saturday night special bans to target both domestically sourced and 
internationally imported firearms classified as Saturday night specials (Hardy, 1983; Zimring, 
1975). Saturday night special bans indicate that these firearms are acquired from a variety of 






 Assault weapons bans, handgun bans, and Saturday night special bans are the three most 
common firearm bans which are implemented in order to decrease gun violence rates. The 
problem and magnitude of gun violence which exists in this country solidified why firearms are a 
topic of interest to many people. This reinforced the need for different policies/interventions that 
have been created overtime. The history of assault weapons bans on both the state and federal 
level provided historical information in order to give a general context and an overview of the 
evolution of firearms bans. The history of handgun bans and their importance in the fight against 
gun violence was also discussed. The landmark court cases which have shaped handgun bans 
gave insight into why handguns bans have been modified over their long history. Moving 
forward in the literature we can begin to see how successful these different firearm bans have 

















This paper used a systematic review in order to identify whether assault weapons bans, 
handgun bans, and Saturday night special bans are effective at decreasing gun availability/illicit 
gun markets, limiting production trends, decreasing gun violence rates, or decreasing the number 
of mass shootings which occur across this country. The review provided insight into the firearm 
bans which have the greatest potential to positively impact these different measures of 
effectiveness. To carry out this systematic review of the literature I conceptualized gun violence 
as the use of a firearm against oneself or another individual which results in death. The review 
covers the years 1979 to 2018, a period where a wide range of policies were implemented. The 
bulk of the literature pertaining to the effectiveness of these polices occurred during the years 
stated. Firearm bans such as the 1994 federal assault weapons ban, the District of Columbia’s 
handgun ban, and other groundbreaking firearm bans reinforce why the years of 1979 to 2018 are 
important in this study’s systematic examination of the literature.  
Google Scholar was used to perform the systematic review. This review used the search 
terms “assault weapon bans effectiveness”, “handgun ban effectiveness”, and “Saturday night 
special ban effectiveness”. There were many search results that appeared for each one of these 
different firearm bans. “Assault weapons ban effectiveness” had 37,500 results, “handgun ban 
effectiveness” had 17,900 results, and “Saturday night special ban effectiveness” had 35,300 
results. The sheer number of articles which Google Scholar found made filtering down this 
research imperative. The review only examined studies that appeared on the first 10 pages of 
Google Scholar results. Google Scholar sorts articles based on how many times an article has 




heavily cited articles about the topics being discussed (Beel & Gipp, 2009). By only looking at 
the most cited literature and defining the cutoff point of research for my review, this kept the 
review to a manageable size while also ensuring that only the most relevant research, as defined 
by citation counts, was included.   
Articles were further filtered to ensure only empirical works were retained. Any article 
which was an opinion piece or did not pertain to the topic at hand was excluded from the 
systematic review of the literature. If an article was an opinion piece and not an empirical journal 
article, it was not included in the overall findings. This was done because of the practical 
constraints associated with this review. Therefore, the findings of this study only included 
research which used a methodological approach testing the effects of bans on any one of the 
different measures of effectiveness (i.e., decrease gun availability/illicit gun markets, limit 
production trends, decrease gun violence rates, or decreasing the number of mass shootings). 
There was a substantial amount of literature associated with irrelevant topics which was 
excluded from this review. For example, articles which discussed what different gunshot wounds 
were like to treat in a hospital setting or articles which discussed banning firearms for the sheer 
reason that they harm people differently were excluded. Other articles that went off in a direction 
that was not related to the objective of this paper were excluded from the review. Though these 
topics may be interesting, it was the objective of the paper to review effectiveness research. 
Studies were systematically excluded from this review if they did not address the success of the 
three different firearm bans.  
Overall, and using the specified criteria, the systematic review of the literature found five 
research articles that discussed the effectiveness of assault weapons bans, seven research articles 




effectiveness of Saturday night special bans. Additional non-empirical articles are discussed for 
context.   
 Before conducting a systematic review of the literature, it must be acknowledged that the 
method, as applied here, has limitations. The first one was that there was too much literature to 
review. This prevented my review from examining every study in existence about firearms bans. 
There were thousands of search results per firearm ban. Once my review defined that the first 10 
pages of search results would be enough to conduct this systematic review of the literature, the 
volume of literature still had to be reduced. Articles were considered relevant when it was 
established that they discussed the relationship between firearm bans and the different measures 
of effectiveness examined in this study. Other limitations included limited search terms and a 
limited time frame to conduct a search. The search terms that were used to conduct this search 
were very broad due to the fact that this topic is very broad and disputed. Due to this broad 
search terms were used in a hope of covering a large body of disputed research. The scope of the 
review was constrained due to deadlines to complete the review. Political influence is another 
limitation that this study had to contend with. Throughout the literature there are many different 
political opinions that appeared to interject themselves into the literature. This made 
disseminating and collecting different research difficult. Personal views of the researcher was 
also a possible limitation of this study. This is because personal opinion sometimes finds its way 
into our research. Looking forward this needs to be addressed in research. 
 Another limitation of my study is that each study used different research methods. So, 
sample sizes, strengths of the study design were not taken into account by my review of the 
literature. Weighing the methods of one study against the methods of another study was not the 




literature suggests about the effectiveness of these three different firearm bans and their overall 
effectiveness. Therefore, this is a limitation of my study because it is looking at the broad impact 
of these interventions and not necessary the individual methodical approaches used to conduct 
the different studies included in this review. These are the major limitations of my systematic 
review of the literature. Other limitations include the fact of the scope of this research is very 
broad and that future research should strive to narrow the findings presented in this paper. The 
final limitation of this study is that there are a lot of nuances within each ban; this makes 
comparing each ban difficult. Future research should strive to address these concerns. An 
example of this would be how a specific ban was implemented or the time frame in which the 
ban lasted. 
Summary  
 Findings related to these three different types of firearm bans are shown in Tables 1, 2, 
and 3. Assault weapons bans produced mixed results in decreasing gun availability/illicit gun 
markets and mass shootings. Assault weapons bans were also found to be ineffective at 
decreasing production or gun violence rates. Handgun bans were found to be ineffective at 
decreasing gun violence rates. No other measure of effectiveness was reviewed by the handgun 
ban literature. Saturday night special bans were found to be effective at decreasing gun 
availability/illicit gun markets, however, they were found to ineffective at decreasing gun 
violence rates. No other measure of effectiveness was examined by the Saturday night special 










Table 1  
Summary Findings from Firearm Ban Studies, 1979 to 2018 
ASSAULT WEAPON BANS  
 
Authors (Year)  Type of Ban Measures of 
Effectiveness 
  Gun availability/ 
Illicit Gun Markets   





Weapons ban.  
Created a short-term 
reduction in the 
availability of assault 
weapons to criminals  
 
Caused the increase in 
production of AW’s before 
the ban went into place  
 
  






that the federal 
assault weapons ban 
failed to target illicit 
gun markets  
 
 The short-term impact of 
the 1994-1996 assault 
weapons ban 
demonstrates a positive 
impact on gun violence 
rates  
 
The ban failed to reduce 
the average number of 
victims per gun murder 
incident or multiple 









  Found that the federal 
assault weapons ban was 
moderately effective in 
reducing gun short term 
gun violence rates(+) 
 
The 1994 Federal assault 
weapons ban had no 
significant long-term 
effect on homicide rates. 










   Federal and state assault 
weapons bans failed to 
decrease public mass 
shootings. 
 
Only the federal assault 
weapons ban had a negative 








  Found that assault 
weapons represent less 
than 2% of guns involved 
in gun violence events. In 
their study 41 of 43 
estimates show that 
assault weapons were 
used in 1.8% of all gun 
violence events. 
Furthermore, Kleck found 
that assault weapons 
accounted for 1.39% of 









Summary Findings from Firearm Ban Studies, 1979 to 2018 
HANDGUN BANS  
 
Authors (Year) Type of Ban  Measures of 
Effectiveness  
  Gun availability/ 
Illicit Gun Markets   
Production Trends Gun Violence Rates Mass 
Shootings 
Loftin et al. (1999) District of Columbia 
handgun ban 
  Restrictive licensing 
of handguns was 
associated with a 
prompt decline in 
homicides and 
suicides by firearms 
in the District of 
Columbia. 
 
Jones et al. (1981) District of Columbia 
handgun ban 
  Firearm Control 
Regulations act had a 
significantly positive 
impact on handgun 
homicides.  
 
Webster et al. (2014) Missouri’s handgun 
licensing law on 
homicides 
  An increase in annual 
firearm homicide 
rates in Missouri 
occurred. 
 
Kleck and Patterson (1993) General Gun controls  
 
  Gun prevalence levels 
had no impact on 
total violence rates. 
Found that most gun 
control restrictions 
generally have no net 
effect on violence 
rates.  
Of the 108 
assessments of effects 
of different gun laws 
on gun violence 
levels, 7 indicated 
good support for gun 
control and another 
11 indicated partial 




handgun bans may 
reduce suicide, 
though this weak 
result reflected such 
control sin only two 








  The D.C. handgun 
ban failed to decrease 
gun violence rates. 
 
Moorhouse and Wanner (2006) State-level data and 
District of Columbia 
handgun ban data 
  The empirical 
analysis found no 
support for the 
contention that gun 
control reduces gun 
violence rates.  
 
Hahn et al. (2005) Examination of 
federal, state and 
local laws to examine 
handgun bans.  
  Inconsistent findings. 
Study was unable to 
determine if Handgun 












Summary Findings from Firearm Ban Studies, 1979 to 2018 
SATURDAY NIGHT SPEICAL BANS  
 
Authors (Year) Type of Ban  Measures of 
Effectiveness  
   
  Gun availability/ 
Illicit Gun Markets   
Production Trends Gun Violence Rates Mass Shootings 
Vernick (1999) Determine the effects 
of the 1988 Maryland 





reduced the use of 
Saturday night 
special firearms by 
criminals in 
Baltimore” (p. 259). 
   






that knowing what 
guns criminals use in 
gun violence events 
is the first step in 
decreasing gun 
violence rates. This 
helps guide policies 
which decrease the 
flow of crime prone 
guns into the streets. 
   
Webster et al. (2002) Maryland’s Saturday 
night special ban. 
  “There were no gun 
law effect estimates 
that approached 
statistical 
significance in any 
of the four 
alternative models” 





Wallack (1999) Saturday night 
special bans in 
California.  
  “It is difficult to 
attribute specific and 
direct effects to the 
VPI” (p. 855). No 







special bans in 
California.  
 
  Saturday night 
special bans decrease 
gun violence rates.  
 
 
Hardy (1983)          Saturday night 
special ban in 
Hawaii. 
  Found when 
Saturday night 
special bans were 
implemented in that 
Hawaii, the murder 
rate increased 42%, 
rape increased 144%, 
and robbery 










Assault weapons bans have produced different outcomes across the measures of 
effectiveness presented in this study. There have been many different assault weapons bans 
which have been implemented on both the federal and state levels. It can be said that the goal(s) 
of federal and state bans are similar. They both try to remove this type of firearm from public 
ownership. Of all the bans enacted, the 1934 NFA was the one major assault weapons ban which 
produced lasting change in how often machine guns are used in crime. The next ban that came in 
1989 which placed a ban on foreign imports did very little to promote public safety or decrease 
gun violence during this time period. This can be demonstrated by the national production of 
assault weapons in 1993 even though there was a ban on assault weapons which were imports. 
Even after the ban of import rifles was in place there was still many assault rifles being produced 
domestically. Though assault weapons bans fell short of success in making a meaningful impact 
on gun violence rates they provided mixed results in decreasing gun availability/illicit gun 
markets. Assault weapons bans also provided mixed results on this type of bans effectiveness in 
decreasing mass shooting deaths or injuries. Furthermore, it was found that assault weapons bans 
did not decrease production trends of this kind of weapon. 
Handgun bans target the types of firearms that are most commonly used in crime and 
violence. In the U.S., handguns are the main tool used to cause the gun violence problem that 
exists in this country. Due to this, handgun bans have been implemented which have prohibited 
the possession of handguns in some capacity. Different legislative actions revolve around the 




regarding the success of handgun bans across the jurisdictions in which they have been 
implemented. This will be discussed in further detail.  
Saturday night special bans are another ban which has been implemented in order to 
address the problem of either gun availability/illicit gun markets, production trends, gun violence 
rates, or mass shootings. Most of the literature suggests that implementing Saturday night special 
bans is a promising strategy that can be implemented in order to decrease gun violence rates and 
curb gun availability/illicit gun markets. However, none of the literature discussed, production 
trends or mass shootings. Therefore, the only measure of effectiveness was gun availability/illicit 
gun markets and gun violence rates. Saturday night special bans target an important class of 
handguns which represent 1/3 of guns recovered at crime scenes (Weisser, 2018). The 
effectiveness of these types of bans are as follows.   
Effectiveness of Assault Weapons Bans 
Researchers have investigated different types of bans, including those restricting 
handguns, assault weapons, and Saturday night specials. As discussed in the background and 
history of firearm bans, the first assault weapons ban was enacted in 1934. The 1934 NFA made 
it illegal for the public to own fully automatic machine guns. This policy was enacted to suppress 
criminal enterprises that were flourishing and engaging in violence with assault weapons, 
including the fully automatic Tommy gun. Rarely has the success of the 1934 NFA been 
disputed in modern times. Though it took time and patience, the NFA achieved its goal of 
removing dangerous machine guns from the hands of individuals who would use them for 
criminal purposes. This is demonstrated by the fact that these types of assault weapons (machine 
guns) are rarely used in crime today (Roth & Koper, 1999). Most crimes involving rifles are 




legislation of the 1934 NFA, gun violence events that involve fully automatic assault rifles have 
been drastically reduced. Jacobs (2015) further suggested that there was a ten-year prison term 
attached to possession of firearms classified as assault weapons. Mandatory prison sentences 
coupled with low demand for criminal use of machine guns drove gun violence rates associated 
with these weapons down. Therefore, the 1934 NFA ban on fully automatic weapons 
successfully decreased gun violence rates.  
Following the 1934 NFA, the next assault weapons ban would come in 1989. In 1989, the 
federal government made it illegal to import five categories of foreign rifles. The success of this 
ban has been widely debated because there have been either mixed results or others showing the 
absence of any effective outcomes. Looking at gun availability/illicit gun markets, it was found 
that assault weapons bans created a short-term reducing in the availability of assault weapons to 
criminals (Koper & Roth, 2002). However, the federal assault weapons ban failed to target illicit 
gun markets (Koper & Roth, 1999). These were the only two findings related to gun 
availability/illicit gun markets. The law failed to prohibit duplicates of banned rifles or rifles that 
functioned the same, but were not foreign imports (Koper & Roth, 2002; Roth & Koper, 1999). 
Furthermore, Tartaro (1995) suggests “the analysis of data from twenty-one city and county 
crime laboratories throughout California found that for 1989 only forty-five of the 4,844 firearms 
that the laboratories kept track of fell under the designation ‘assault weapon’” (p. 631). When 
Koper and Roth (2002) examined production trends for prohibited assault weapons during the 
1989 ban they discovered that, “while the law bans exact copies of the named gun makes and 
models, cosmetic changes, such as removing a flash hider or bayonet mount, were sufficient to 
transform a banned weapon into a legal substitute, and a number of manufacturers produced 




to banned firearms made them legal under this legislation. So, assault weapons bans were found 
to be ineffective at decreasing production trends of this type of weapon. 
Another factor that inhibited the success of the 1989 ban on foreign import assault 
weapons was market saturation. Right before the 1989 ban was implemented, the sale of these 
rifles soared. According to Koper and Roth (2002) domestic assault weapons manufacturing 
increased 19% following the implementation of the 1989 ban. While newly imported firearms 
were banned, a huge surplus of these prohibited firearms entered circulation and were permitted 
via the law’s grandfather clause. So, if a firearm entered this country prior to the ban, it was 
permitted to stay. The government allowed citizens to continue to own these weapons because 
they were lawfully purchased prior to the law being imposed.  
Additionally, another factor that impacted the success of this assault weapons ban was 
domestically produced assault weapons. According to Koper and Roth’s (2002) research, from 
1989 through 1993, 91,137 assault weapons were produced annually. This research suggests that 
the even though the 1989 ban on foreign imported assault rifles existed, it did very little to slow 
the production of domestically produced assault rifles.  
In sum, though the 1989 ban tried to limit assault weapon production by ceasing foreign 
imports, it failed to stop the production of domestically equivalent rifles. This is important to 
consider when looking at whether a policy decision was effective at achieving its desired goal. In 
this case, the policy did not actually decrease production trends or gun violence rates. However, 
mixed results were found in relation to the impact assault weapons bans had on gun 
availability/illicit gun markets. According to many, the 1989 ban on foreign imports had flaws 
that were not addressed sufficiently enough to see a meaningful impact on gun violence rates. 




of firearm increased to accommodate the demand that occurred due to liming where these 
weapons can be manufactured. So, these weapons were just produced domestically. This, 
coupled with market saturation, decreased the effectiveness of the 1989 ban on foreign import 
assault weapons.  
Following the ban of foreign imports, the Federal assault weapons ban of 1994 was 
passed by Congress. The 1994 assault weapons ban targeted rifles that had certain physical 
characteristics (i.e., features) present within their design. Lawmakers who constructed the 1994 
federal assault weapons ban were intent on decreasing firearm-related crimes by banning the 
possession and sale of assault weapons. According to Koper and Roth (2002), manufacturers, 
retailers, and customer demand for assault weapons made the supply and demand for assault 
weapons increase prior to the enactment of the law. This limited the success of this gun violence 
intervention strategy and ultimately made the 1994 assault weapons ban very limited in its 
impact on production trends and gun violence rates. In 1994, production trends of prohibited 
assault weapons surged to 203,578 right before the ban was imposed (Koper & Roth, 2002). In 
the year prior to the law’s passage, 91,137 rifles classified as assault weapons were sold. 
Therefore, the looming threat of an assault weapons ban drove the production and sale of these 
rifles up significantly. This created a surplus of rifles prior to the passage of the assault weapon 
ban. This action restricted what the policy was trying to do by saturating the gun market with 
weapons. All firearms sold prior to the ban would be grandfathered in and legal under the 1994 
ban. For those interested in owning this type of firearm, it was important to purchase one prior to 
the ban. Ultimately, this limited the success of the law. The law’s impact was also limited by the 
relative infrequency of assault weapon use during the commission of crimes. Looking at 




the 1994 federal ban accounted for between 1% and 6% of guns used in crime according to most 
of several national and local data sources” (p. 707). Though this statement demonstrates a 
variation of 5%, it still suggests that assault weapons represent a very small portion of guns used 
in crime. Another author also suggested that assault weapons are used in only about 2% of gun 
crimes (Halbrook, 2016). Overall, assault weapons are used in crimes a lot less often than other 
types of firearms. These findings support Makarios and Pratt’s (2012) statement which suggested 
that “the 1994 federal assault weapons ban had no significant effect on homicide rates” (p. 225). 
This is the case due to the relative infrequency in which assault weapons are used in homicides.  
 It must be considered how much a certain policy costs to implement and weigh this against the 
magnitude of the problem trying to be addressed. When examining the different measures of 
effectiveness, it must be considered that other things such as gun availability/illicit gun markets, 
production trends, and mass shootings must be indicators of success beyond that of just gun 
violence rates when determining if assault weapons bans were effective. This leads into another 
issue which limited the success of assault weapons bans. That is, duplicate firearms further 
limited the success of the assault weapons ban. Halbrook (2016) professed that the limited 
effects of assault weapons bans were due to finding that assault weapons are rarely used in 
crimes, between 2 and 6 percent (Halbrook, 2012; Jacobs, 2015). The law’s failure to prohibit 
duplicate firearms or firearms that functioned similarly to prohibited weapons. To be a similar or 
duplicate rifle, the firearm needed to have cosmetic features similar to a military rifle. Therefore, 
by removing a prohibited feature such as a 20-round magazine or a flash hider, front pistol grip, 
bayonet mount, or similar feature, the rifle became legal but also retained almost identical 
functionality and appearance to the pre-modified weapon platform (Halbrook, 2016). These 




the law defining an assault weapon. The only thing that occurred during this time period is that 
more copycat firearms were being produced, undercutting the main goal of the legislation.  
Most crimes are committed with handguns. This is the most popular and convenient 
firearm that can be used in criminal activities, particularly due to the fact that handguns can be 
easily concealed for use in crimes (Guis, 2015). Lack of concealability and relative difficulty of 
use are big reasons why assault weapons represent such a small portion of overall firearms used 
in crime. Much of the evidence surrounding the 1994 federal assault weapons ban demonstrated 
that this ban was not effective at decreasing gun violence rates due to a variety of different 
reasons. According to Roth and Koper (1999), the federal assault weapons ban was also not 
effective at decreasing gun violence rates due to the relatively short period of time in which the 
1994 assault weapons ban was in place. Their study presented unclear findings about the 
effectiveness of the ban.  
Roth and Koper’s (1999) research used national and local data sources to examine 
“market trends, prices, production, and thefts for the banned weapons and close substitutes 
before estimating potential ban effects and their consequences” (p. 2). Their ultimate conclusion 
was that there were too many restrictions on the 1994 ban in order for this ban to be considered 
effective. Market trends, prices, production, and theft of assault weapons really affected the 
success of this ban. Similarly, another study produced by Koper and Roth arrived at the same 
conclusion as the Roth and Koper (1999) study. According to Koper and Roth (2002) 
“manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers regarding gun control policies can have 
substantial effects on demand and supply for affected weapons both before and after a law’s 
implementation. These factors will, in turn, affect the timing and form of a law’s impact on the 




(p. 264). This is due to how fluid and easily new firearm bans can be to external influenced 
placed on them. When tracing the lineage of assault weapons bans over time and looking at the 
impact that they have had on gun violence rates, Koper and Roth (2002) used state-level data 
from 1970 to 1995 to compare the rates of gun violence during this time period to the level of 
gun violence during the federal assault weapons ban that was enacted from 1995 to 2004. Their 
ultimate discovery was that the federal assault weapons ban had little to no impact on homicide 
rates during this time period. This was particularly due to this type of weapon being used in 2% 
of gun violence events and that the long-term impact of this ban did not reflect a change in how 
many assault weapons were in circulation and use (Koper & Roth, 2002).  
According to Koper and Roth (2002) “assault weapons declined from 2.1% of 
confiscated guns before the ban to 1.6% after the ban, a relative decrease of about 24%” (p. 260). 
Therefore, before the ban went into place the rate in which this type of firearm was being seized 
was higher than the rate that this firearm was being seized after the ban was in place. As 
suggested by Kleck (2001) assault weapons represent less than 2% of guns involved in crime. In 
his study, 41 of 43 estimates showed that assault weapons were used in 1.8% of all gun violence 
events. Furthermore, Kleck found that assault weapons accounted for 1.39% of all crime guns 
(Kleck, 2001). So, it appears as though there was a larger reduction in the circulation of this 
firearm prior to an assault weapons ban being implemented but not a large decrease in gun 
violence rates associated with this type of firearm once this ban was in place. Once this firearm 
ban was put into place, we began to see less of this type of weapon being seized while gun 
violence rates associated with weapon remained stable. Following the 2004 expiration of the 




assault weapons within the confines of its borders. This has resulted in seven states plus the 
District of Columbia creating their own state regulations to control assault weapons.  
 One study conducted by Guis (2015) looked beyond just murder rates and asked whether 
assault weapon bans affected mass shootings and murder rates. According to Guis’s (2015) 
study, “both state and federal assault weapons bans have statistically significant and negative 
effects on mass shooting fatalities but, that only the federal assault weapons ban had a negative 
effect on mass shooting injuries” (p. 281).This finding suggests that federal and state assault 
weapons bans do not decrease public mass shootings, but federal assault weapons bans may be 
worth implementing due to their effectiveness in decreasing mass shooting injuries.  
The 1994 federal assault weapons ban was influenced by lobbyist activity and the poor 
performance of the ban itself. So, the fact that the ban did not work as intended, greatly impacted 
why it was not continued after its expiration. This is because there were lobbyist groups such as 
the NRA who argued that since the ban did not decrease gun violence rates, it should not be 
continued.  
Effectiveness of Handgun Bans 
Handgun-related violence makes up the majority of the U.S. gun violence problem. When 
looking at what the literature suggested in relation to our different measures of effectiveness no 
studies discussed gun availability/illicit gun markets, production trends, or mass shootings, 
however, gun violence rates were discussed in great detail. Research shows that handgun bans 
produce mixed results in decreasing gun violence rates. This has created quite a bit of 
controversy among researchers. Most of the literature pertaining to handgun bans has only 
looked at the impact of the District of Columbia’s ban. This is because the District of Columbia’s 




other ban can exist the same way the District of Columbia’s ban did because of the constitutional 
legitimacy of the ban itself. The Supreme Court ruled that the outright ban of handguns in the 
District of Columbia was unconstitutional. Therefore, any jurisdiction that wishes to impose a 
ban in the same way that the District of Columbia did will not be able to. As suggested by Loftin 
et al. (1991), restricting access to handguns is a topic of intense debate due to strong beliefs on 
both sides of the handgun ban literature. Some literature has found however, that the District of 
Columbia’s ban decreased gun violence rates and research which suggests otherwise needs to 
make realistic assumptions about the impact of any intervention directed at gun violence (Jones, 
1981). According to Jones’s (1981) study, the data suggested that handgun fatalities can be 
reduced with restrictions aimed at limiting firearm ownership. This is particularly due to 
removing one avenue offenders use to acquire firearms. Other authors have also suggested that 
this is an effective method to influence gun violence. According to Loftin et al. (1991), the 
District of Columbia’s ban on handguns was associated with a 23% decline in firearm homicides 
and suicides. It was also suggested that there was a thirteen percent rise in violent crime in the 10 
years leading up to the Handgun Crime Control Act of 1981, but a steep decline once the District 
of Columbia’s handgun ban was in place. (Loftin et al., 1991). Other studies have also supported 
the regulation of handguns. According to Jones et al. (1981), once the District of Columbia’s 
handgun ban was in place it decreased gun violence rates by limiting access to firearms. In D.C 
the homicide rate involving handguns was 9.8 percent of the total homicides which occurred in 
Washington D.C. prior to the ban, however, following the implementation of the D.C. handgun 
ban, this percentage was decreased to 4.5 percent (Jones et al., 1981). This suggests that in this 
instance a handgun ban was successful in decreasing gun violence rates. Moving from the 




also literature which suggests otherwise. Webster, Crifasi, and Vernick’s (2014) study indicated 
that handgun bans which were imposed in California and Massachusetts caused an increase in 
homicide rates. In California and Massachusetts, the relationship between state handgun bans 
and gun violence rates was examined. It was suggested that “new unsafe handgun bans adopted 
in California and Massachusetts were associated with an increase in total homicide rates” 
(Webster et al., 2014, p. 298). This was hypothesized to be caused by changes in local 
circumstances, such as gun trafficking to both areas, and changes in social norms (e.g., gang 
activity and how guns were acquired). Stated differently, restrictions in place in California and 
Massachusetts created an opportunity for gun trafficking. So, handgun ban restrictions produced 
illicit opportunities for illegal gun dealers (Webster et al., 2014). Firearms were being illegally 
imported and sold at a higher rate than they were prior to the ban due to the illicit business 
opportunity created by these new handgun restrictions. This in turn influences gun violence rates 
due to the increase in crime guns circulating on the streets. 
In Kleck and Patterson’s (1993) work “data was gathered on all 170 U.S. cities which had 
a population of at least 100,000 or larger. The cities were coded for the presence of 19 major 
categories of firearms restrictions, including both state- and city-level restrictions. Multiple 
indirect indicators of gun prevalence levels were measured, and models of city violence rates 
were estimated using two-state least-squares methods” (p. 249). They examined 29 different 
studies and found 4 studies suggested gun control measures decreased gun violence rates, 8 
studies had mixed results, and 17 studies suggested that gun control was not effective at 
decreasing gun violence rates. This indicates that more studies found that gun control measures 
were ineffective at decreasing gun violence rates than studies which suggested that gun control 




no net effect on violence rates” (Kleck & Patterson, 1993, p. 249). They suggested that the most 
promising way to decrease gun violence rates would be to implement mandatory penalties that 
target gun carrying habits of offenders. Gun control measures increase demand for illicit gun 
markets once they are implemented. This in turn, can cause an increase in gun violence rates 
where gun control measures are in place. By targeting the offenders who are most likely to carry 
firearms and punishing them accordingly, potential offenders should be deterred. This would be 
a more promising alternative to most gun control measures (Kleck & Patterson, 1993).  
Another study by Britt, Bordua, and Kleck (1996) examined the impact and effectiveness 
of the District of Columbia’s handgun ban on gun violence rates. In this study, monthly homicide 
data was used from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Center for Health 
Statistics in order to determine the impact of the D.C. handgun ban. Gun violence rates did not 
decrease once this handgun ban was in place. This study also compared the findings to 
Baltimore’s gun violence rates given its similarity to D.C. and the fact that it did not have a 
handgun ban at the time. Therefore, an area with a handgun ban and an area without a handgun 
ban were examined to see if a handgun ban in one city changed gun violence rates across two 
similarly situated cities. In Baltimore where no handgun ban was in place, a reduction in 
handgun death fatalities occurred but in D.C where there was a handgun ban, no reductions in 
gun violence rates occurred (Britt et al., 1996).  
Some evidence presented in research suggests that the District of Columbia’s handgun 
ban was effective at decreasing gun violence rates because there was a reduction in the number 
of deaths that occurred following the implementation of the ban. This finding, however, does not 
take into account a general pattern of declining gun violence rates that preceded the enactment of 




suggested that there was a thirteen percent rise in violent crime in the 10 years leading up to the 
Handgun Crime Control Act of 1981. Therefore, disagreement exists as to whether there was an 
increase or decrease in crime leading up to the Crime Control Act of 1981. When taking into 
consideration what the bulk of the literature related to the District of Columbia’s handgun ban 
suggests, we begin to see that the prohibition of the ownership and possession of handguns does 
not necessarily mean that gun violence rates will decrease. According to Moorhouse and Wanner 
(2006) 
Using state-level data and that for the District of Columbia, this study estimates both the 
impact of gun control on crime rates and the influence of crime rates on gun control. The 
measure of gun control adopted here is a comprehensive index, published by the Open 
Society Institute, covering 30 different facets of state gun laws, enforcement effort, and 
the stringency of local gun ordinances. The index weights upstream measures. It also 
weights regulations governing handguns more heavily than those on long guns. Using a 
vector of demographic economic, and law enforcement control variables, the empirical 
analysis presented here provides no support for the contention that gun control reduces 
crime rates (p. 121). 
 
They gave two possible explanations for this finding. They suggested that gun control 
may not influence how criminals acquire firearms because criminals break the law to purchase 
guns through illicit markets or can acquire their firearms through theft. Though banning 
handguns has decreased gun violence rates in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, the 
U.S. is drastically different than these countries and helps explain why the U.S. has not had the 
same benefits associated with banning handgun possession (Mauser, 2012). The heterogenous 
nature of the U.S. as well as the gun culture that is rooted in the history of this country makes 
handgun bans less successful than anticipated. The culture surrounding guns in this country 
glorifies guns and makes freedom synonymous with firearms. Therefore, looking at how the 
United States gained its independence and freedom from Great Britain can help explain how and 




guns in this country is rooted in the belief of self-preservation and the ability to fight against 
tyranny imposed by the government. This is what makes the U.S. different than other countries 
in their quest to control and regulate firearms.  
Court cases have helped solidify what the U.S. Constitution states in regard to the right to 
keep and bear arms. In the court case District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008 the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that any handgun ban which removed an individual citizens ability to protect and 
defend themselves is a violation of the of the Second Amendment (Craven, 2010). Therefore, 
taking into account what the literature has suggested in regard to the success of the District of 
Columbia’s handgun ban, other bans implemented across this country, and Supreme Court 
rulings, we can see how successful handgun bans have been where they have been implemented 
and whether or not they are a viable solution to the problem of gun violence.  
In the present-day America, handgun bans do not exist in the way they did in the District 
of Columbia or Chicago prior to the court rulings that changed the way these two locations 
implemented controls on handguns. There are certain locations where handguns are more tightly 
regulated; this is achieved by making it more difficult for individuals to legally acquire a firearm 
or carry a firearm in a legal capacity. How handgun bans have been implemented over time, as 
well as court ruling that have given them direction and imposed limitations, must be considered 
when providing policy recommendations. As suggested by the literature, handgun bans have 
demonstrated mixed results, however, much of the research suggests that they do not work the 
way they were intended. Of the studies reviewed more of them found that handgun bans do not 
decrease gun violence than those which found that they did. Court rulings that have been passed 
have demonstrated that outright total handgun bans are not a currently legally acceptable practice 




blanket handgun bans cannot exist and that blanket handgun bans cannot deny handgun 
ownership to law abiding citizens. This has ultimately impacted the potential effectiveness of 
handgun bans in America. 
Effectiveness of Saturday Night Special Bans  
 Throughout the literature, Saturday night special bans have demonstrated an important 
role in regulating certain types of weapons prone to use in crime. Within the literature reviewed, 
Saturday night special bans only significantly affected gun availability/illicit gun markets.  They 
were ineffective at reducing gun violence rates and, because of the lack of literature, no 
assessments were made about the effects of bans on production or mass shootings.   
Most of the literature collected either discussed gun availability/illicit gun markets or gun 
violence rates. Proponents of Saturday night special bans suggest that they take away the most 
common types of firearms used in crimes (Vernick, 1999; Weisser, 2018). According to 
research, firearms which meet the requirements to be classified as Saturday special firearms are 
weapons which are cheap and are well-liked by criminals due to the little value that must be 
invested in this tool. Most literature pertaining to Saturday night special bans has found that 
banning low quality, cheap, handguns produced non-significant results in decreasing gun 
violence rates, however, this may be an effective strategy to decrease gun availability/illicit gun 
markets. According to Weisser (2018) junk guns which were used in crimes and then traced by 
the ATF account for one-third of all gun recovered annually. This is due to its high proclivity 
toward being carried by criminals. 
Maryland is a perfect example to discuss Saturday night special bans. Once Maryland had 
a Saturday night special ban in place, fewer Saturday night special firearms were recovered from 




handguns that were used in crime by about 12 percentage points. The findings suggest that 
Saturday night special bans “can affect the type of gun used by criminals” (p. 263). This 
demonstrates that the availability of this firearm can directly impact the carrying impacts habits 
of these guns by offenders. Saturday night special bans can also be an important tool in order to 
decrease the illicit gun markets surrounding this type of handgun.  
Moving from Maryland to California, researchers have also found that Saturday night 
special bans produced non-significant decreases in gun violence rates; however, it was found that 
this type of ban can impact availability of this type of firearm. Wallack (1999) noted 80% of 
Saturday night special firearms are produced in Southern California. Knowing this, there was an 
apparent need to regulate cheap, low quality Saturday night special firearms. As suggested by 
Wallack (1999), Saturday night special bans have shown in California that if you can guide what 
type of handguns are able to be sold to the public, this can in turn could be a real and effective 
strategy to decrease gun violence across the state.  
California regulated guns similar to other consumer products. According to Godwin and 
Schroedel (2000), California used “legal action to sue gun manufacturers alleging violations of 
California’s consumer protection laws” (p. 762). California wanted to regulate firearms the same 
as other products which could harm or have harmed citizens. It was also the hope that this policy 
would be replicated by other states which were trying to make it more difficult to sell guns to 
citizens. Gun dealers might think twice before selling guns to people who looked like they were 
going to use them for illicit purposes. So besides banning cheap, low quality firearms that had a 
proclivity to be used by offenders in gun crimes, California also used legal action to target the 
poor intentions of gun manufacturers who produced firearms classified under Saturday night 




purposes often associated with criminal activity and not much else. Collectors or general citizens 
rarely seek out these types of firearms when making a handgun purchase (Goodwin & Schroedel, 
2000). They were instead more commonly used as a cheap gun for violent criminals needing a 
gun that could be disposable after their crime was committed (Wallack, 1999). Gun 
manufacturers knew this and used this type of firearm to make profits off a niche market.  
Another study has supported the notion that the way California went about targeting 
Saturday night special firearms was an effective and useful strategy to target the most common 
types of guns used in crime (Kopel, 2000). Guns should be treated like other consumer products 
because a certain amount of government regulation is imperative to improve the safety of the 
public when potentially dangerous tools (i.e., guns) are involved. Using the consumer products 
approach to ban and regulate the types of firearms that gun manufacturers produce demonstrated 
promising results in decreasing gun violence rates in California. A study of youth in Oakland, 
California demonstrated that the cheap, low quality handguns which flooded the streets in 
California impacted the number of youths who carried a gun to school (Calhoun, 2013).  
According to Calhoun (2013) “one in twenty high school youth reported that they had 
carried a gun to school” (p. 73). This number was suggested to be so high because of the many 
pocket-sized, cheap, low quality firearms which were introduced to the California gun market. 
This is significant because if Saturday night special bans can decrease the surplus of cheap, low 
quality firearms on the streets which are easily accessible to some youth, this could decrease the 
number of youth deaths resulting from firearms. According to Weisser (2018) junk guns which 
were used in crimes and then traced by the ATF account for one-third of all gun recovered 
annually. However, there exists literature which suggests that Saturday night special bans were 




Maryland’s Saturday night special ban impacted aggregate handgun sales but not gun violence 
rates. Furthermore, Webster et al. (2002) suggested that it was difficult to determine why rates in 
homicide changed following the implementation of Saturday night special bans. This is due to 
the many different variables that could have potentially impacted gun violence rates. As 
suggested by Webster et al. (2002) homicide rates in Maryland could have potentially been 
influenced by social standards, and demographic and economic covariates. This finding 
suggested that “gun law effect estimates can be sensitive to the assumptions made about the 
plausible timing of their effects” (Webster et al., 2002, p. 412). This suggests that even though a 
Saturday night special ban was imposed in Maryland and decreases in crime rates also occurred 
following its implementation, this does not necessarily mean that the decrease in gun violence 
rates resulted from the Saturday night special ban. The decrease in gun violence rate could have 
been a result of some other confounding phenomena. Other authors such as Wallack (1999) also 
found non-significant results. In this study. The author stated that “it was difficult to attribute 
specific and direct effects of the VPI (Violence Prevention Initiative)” (Wallack, 1999, p. 855).  
Hardy (1983) conducted a study in Hawaii which found when Saturday night special bans 
were implemented in that state, the murder rate increased 42%, rape increased 144%, and 
robbery increased 79%. What all the evidence suggests in relation to Saturday night special bans 
is that they appear to be effective in decreasing the availability or illicit gun markets that revolve 
around this weapon, however, it was found that this type of ban had no significant impact on gun 
violence rates or mass shootings. This is what a majority of the literature suggests about Saturday 
night special bans. Therefore, due to the complexity of studying firearm bans and looking at all 
the nuanced details about different bans across various locations there are discrepancies as to 




 There are multiple arguments which are made against Saturday night special bans. Some 
researchers have argued that Saturday night special bans increase gun violence rates while others 
argue that Saturday night special bans only take away guns from poor people who live in 
neighborhoods that are extremely dangerous (Hardy, 1983; Webster, 2002). Saturday night 
special bans take away common means of protection from individuals who do not possess a lot 
of money. As suggested by Webster, (2002) Saturday night special bans take away firearms 
which are affordable to indigent individuals who are inclined to need a firearm for protection the 
most. When Saturday night special bans are implemented, they target the classes of weapons that 
most indigent people are able to afford. This drastically impacts some people’s ability to acquire 
a firearm once these types of bans have gone into place.  
As suggested by Cook (1981), at this point in time, it is unreasonable to assume that the 
price of a firearm will dictate the number of crimes committed by indigent individuals. Saturday 
night special bans disproportionately target indigent individuals who are law abiding. Saturday 
night special bans may not affect criminals the way that it affects indigent law-abiding citizens. 
Making assumptions about proclivity towards crime based on social status or wealth is not a 
means to create effective policy decisions. The consequences of targeting cheap firearms on 
certain populations in our society should be studied. If the benefits of removing Saturday night 
special firearms outweigh the cons of removing cheap firearms from indigent populations, this 
should be considered in policy decisions. The literature collected for this study suggests 
universally that Saturday night special bans are effective at decreasing gun availability/illicit gun 
markets but there ineffective at reducing gun violence rates. None of the literature reviewed 







 The evidence suggested in the literature review reinforce and guide suggestions of 
whether the three types of firearm bans are effective methods that can be implemented to 
decrease gun availability/illicit gun markets, production trends, gun violence rates, or mass 
shootings. It should be noted that the guiding principle of this paper was to review what most of 
the studies suggested in relation to the effectiveness of these different firearm bans. Looking at 
firearm bans it is difficult to determine the quality of evidence due to extraneous factors, public 
opinion, and ethics/morality of people who weigh in on these topics. Research pertaining to 
firearm bans is also affected by political influence in research. This topic is highly disputed and 
comprised of many different details between each ban, which makes determining overall 
effectiveness challenging. Methodologically, studies can be drastically different and how and 
why studies were conducted in a certain way can vary drastically. I determined if a firearm ban 
was successful if more studies found that it was successful than not successful. This provided 
more simplicity in assessing each study; however, it is also a major limitation of this study 
because it fails to take into account the methodological strength of each study reviewed. Another 
limitation of this study is that the study itself is very broad.  
Assault Weapons   
Assault weapons bans started with the 1934 NFA and advanced from there. Assault 
weapons bans have targeted firearms which have certain features present within their design. 
Overall findings suggested mixed results in determining the effectiveness of assault weapon bans 
and their ability to decrease gun availability/illicit gun markets and mass shootings. Due to the 




research needed to be done on this topic in the future. This is because the research is so 
conflicted and scattered. This is also the case for mass shooting literature related to assault 
weapon bans. Additionally, it was also found that assault weapons bans were not effective in 
decreasing production or gun violence rates. Therefore, it must suggested that more research 
needs to be done to determine if assault weapons bans can be implemented in order to potentially 
make a positive impact on society. This is because there 
Handgun Bans 
The effectiveness of handgun bans was mixed throughout the literature. A lot of the 
literature reviewed looked at the District of Columbia’s handgun ban. This is because this was 
the largest federal handgun ban that has ever been implemented. Due to the restrictions that this 
ban placed on citizens the U.S. Supreme Court eventually hear this case. This resulted in 
Supreme Court rulings which defined what kind of restrictions could be placed on handguns. Of 
the different handgun bans reviewed the general consensus is that they generally do not have the 
desired impact on gun violence rates. None of the literature reviewed looked at any other 
measure of effectiveness other than gun violence rates. Therefore, this was the only measure of 
effectiveness related to this type of firearm ban. Four of the seven articles found that handguns 
bans had a negative impact on gun violence rates. Two articles found that handgun bans have a 
positive impact on gun violence rates. Therefore, more of the studies found that handgun bans 
were not an effective strategy to decrease gun violence rates. 
 Throughout the literature review it has been suggested that in places which have 
implemented handgun bans, they have not been as successful as anticipated. According to 
Mauser (2012), handgun bans are generally unsuccessful because there are too many guns in 




guns are so readily available to criminals that restricting the formal market of handguns is 
overshadowed by the illicit market that exists for handguns in this country. When examining the 
District of Columbia’s handgun ban, the literature suggested that even though there was a 
handgun ban in place, the rate of gun violence in this jurisdiction was still significantly higher 
than areas without a handgun ban with similar population density, racial and class composition, 
and economy (Moorhouse & Wanner, 2006; Kleck & Patterson, 1993). So, considering the 
constitutionality of handgun bans, as well as what the literature suggested in relation to their 
effectiveness, I would suggest that an alternative strategy be to target individuals who are most 
prone to use handguns in an illicit manner. This could be done through increased sentence 
lengths when a firearm is involved in a crime or hot spots policing tactics could be implemented 
in order to address gun problems in certain locations (Kleck & Patterson, 1993).  
When looking at the effectiveness of handgun bans it is also important to consider what 
some literature has suggested in regard to the amount of legally owned handguns that are 
actually used in crime by law abiding citizens. According to Kates (1979), people who commit 
murder with a handgun represent a very small portion of all handgun owners in U.S. society. 
Kates (1979) goes on to suggested that most handgun owners are law abiding firearm owners 
who do not deserve regulations which take away their right to owe a firearm. This becomes a 
constitutional issue when this is done. Looking at the District of Columbia ban can help provide 
insight into this fundamental right. Malcom (2008) suggests that the District of Columbia ban 
failed to protect its citizens during the application of the handgun ban because it deprived 
citizens of the right to protect themselves. It is also important to consider that the District of 
Columbia’s homicide rate did not drastically decline after the ban was in place (Malcom, 2008). 




that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban did was limit the ability of law-abiding citizens to 
acquire a handgun. It was suggested by Kates (1979) that handgun bans do not decrease gun 
violence rates due to already low and declining crime rates coupled with the small percentage of 
gun owners who actually use their guns in homicides. These two considerations weighed against 
taking away a citizen’s proper means to protect themselves (e.g., handguns) are the reasons why 
handgun bans do not decrease crime rates as drastically as commonly anticipated.  
Lastly, implementing mandatory penalties that target gun carrying habits of offenders 
could provide incentive for offenders to carry guns less often (Kleck & Patterson, 1993). If 
offenders are held responsible for their illegal gun carrying habits, this could potentially 
encourage them not to carry firearms. Implementing mandatory penalties (i.e., mandatory 
minimum prison sentences when guns are involved and elevated sentencing), I believe would be 
more successful than creating gun free zones because there is no guarantee that offenders will 
obey the restrictions of gun free zones. Offenders break laws often, therefore, creating another 
one for them to follow creates more questions as to whether they will follow it.  
As suggested by Kleck and Patterson (1993) one of the most promising way to decrease 
gun violence rates would be to implement mandatory penalties that target gun carrying habits of 
offenders. This would be a mechanism that could be used to punish offenders as opposed to 
hoping that offenders will follow another law. Another promising way to decrease gun violence 
rates would be to improve the system of universal background checks in order to make them 
more effective at restricting gun purchases to individuals who should not possess firearms. If it 
was possible to remove all handguns from U.S. society, this would certainly decrease gun 
violence rates. This is particularly due to the fact that most gun violence is committed with 




guns in circulation for this to work and the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it violates the 
constitution.  
Saturday Night Special Ban 
The Saturday night special ban literature suggested some interesting findings. It was 
found that Saturday night special bans were effective at decreasing gun availability/illicit gun 
markets. Saturday night special bans provided a non-significant impact in decreasing gun 
violence rates. Two studies had no significant results, while one study had positive results and 
the other study had a negative result. Therefore, more of the studies found that Saturday night 
special bans had a non-significant impact on gun violence rates. The other two measures of 
effectiveness were not covered in the Saturday night special ban literature. 
Saturday night special bans target the most common type of firearms that are being used 
by offenders; which are low quality, cheap, and disposable (Vernick et al., 1999). This type of 
ban demonstrates great success in regulating and controlling these junk firearms. In Maryland 
where a Saturday night special ban was implemented the proportion of low caliber handguns 
used in violent crime was reduced by 12 percentage points (Vernick et al., 1999). As suggested 
previously, Weisser (2018) found that of the handguns where recovered by the ATF one-third of 
them were junk firearms.  
 These findings demonstrate a need for the restriction of handguns targeted by Saturday 
night special bans because these types of handguns are more likely to be used in crime. This is 
based merely on the finding that this intervention is effective in controlling the availability of 
this gun and the illicit gun markets that surround this type of firearm. This is because cheap, junk 
firearms are the weapon of choice for most criminals. This is due to their cheap price, and ability 




special bans continue to be implemented. I would also suggest that in other locations that do not 
have Saturday night special bans, they implement this type of gun control policy because the 
literature has suggested that this is an effective method which can be implemented to decrease 
the availability/markets of Saturday night specials. I would advocate for creating regulations to 
stop the sale of cheap and disposable handguns. The goal of this would be to cut down on the 
supply of cheap, disposable, crime guns in circulation. Decreasing gun violence rates can 
potentially be achieved by controlling a small set of the overall handgun population responsible 
for the most amount of damage to our society. Through legislation targeting cheap, disposable, 
crime guns can help achieve this. 
Another thing that makes Saturday night special bans different than other gun policies 
that have been implemented is the wide support for this type of ban. According to Wallack 
(1999) 78% of people polled for their study supported Saturday night special bans. The support 
for this restriction is different than handgun bans because most people recognize that certain 
weapons need to be controlled more heavily than others. Also, a restriction placed on Saturday 
night special bans does not impede on someone’s constitutional rights as much as a ban of 
Saturday night specials. Having public support for a specific gun control policy is an important 
component that could potentially increase the success of the specific intervention that is being 
tests. Saturday night special bans demonstrated this in California, the capital of junk firearm 
production. As suggested previously by Wallack (1999) 80% of all Saturday night special 
firearms are produced in Southern California. In generating large public support for Saturday 
night special bans, they were able to decrease gun violence rates by implementing a gun control 
policy that had mass support from the public. Public support for Saturday night special bans, as 




that this gun control policy actually makes a meaningful impact on gun violence rates where it is 
implemented. Taking firearms off the street which are designed and dispersed with the intention 
that they will be used in crime is an empirically based and intelligent decision that can be made 
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